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Abstract
This paper investigates the conditional demands of Death-Is-Different
jurisprudence in the United States criminal justice system and argues
that the dissonance between the need for heightened protections in
capital sentencing and the reality of our capital-sentencing institutions
ultimately renders the death penalty, as it currently exists in our society,
impermissible. This claim is substantiated in three parts: first, through
an analysis of foundational death penalty decisions from the Supreme
Court, which condemn the arbitrary nature of capital juries while simultaneously justifying their constitutional necessity as sentencing agents;
second, through an examination of the development of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence and its conceptual implications for the application
of the death penalty; and finally, through an identification of the faults
that render capital juries unable to meet the protective standard that
America’s Death-Is-Different principle requires.

Introduction
Many proponents of the death penalty in the United States argue that,
as a sentence, execution is qualitatively different from all other punishments. That capital punishment requires an ethical, as opposed to a legal,
judgment, and given the severity and finality of its consequence, punishment by death is understood as intrinsically distinct. Thus, its sentencing
demands heightened, and reliable, protections against error within the
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criminal justice system. Acknowledging this principle in our death
penalty jurisprudence undoubtedly eases anxiety about the persistence
of capital punishment in the United States. Both the presence of court
decisions that limit capital-sentencing procedures and the implementation of death-specific safeguards have produced an aura of rationality and
regulation in modern capital sentencing. By nature, these mechanisms
work to satisfy the foundational principle that the punishment of death
must be treated differently than all other forms of punishment. Moreover,
utilizing capital juries as the deciding agents in these existential decisions
diffuses responsibility and gives the process “an immediate democratic
appearance” (Abramson).
However, despite such perceptions, the reality of death penalty law falls
far below the standard of heightened reliability that capital-sentencing cases demand. Supreme Court decisions have resulted in procedural
paradoxes, and the “seemingly intricate and demanding constraints [of
death penalty safeguards] appear quite marginal” when inspected closely
(Mandery 171-180). Additionally, systematic factors insulate capital
jurors from the context needed to seriously and accurately represent the
will of their community. Despite the notion that death should be different,
it is evident that the protections in death cases are not as different as they
appear to be. This asymmetry, between the appearance and the reality
of death penalty law, has a disastrous effect. It creates an exaggerated
assumption of fairness and rationality in capital sentencing, numbs
actors within the criminal justice system, and degrades the effectiveness and reliability of our capital jury system altogether. As a result of
these factors, the faults embedded in the modern American death penalty
prevent us from truly treating death as different, as required by philosophical and legal logic. For this reason, our current application of capital
punishment is impermissible and ought not be imposed until these systematic issues are resolved.
I will substantiate this claim by highlighting three things: first, the foundational Supreme Court decisions involving the death penalty, which
problematically demonstrate the arbitrary nature of capital juries as well
as their constitutional necessity in death penalty cases; second, the legal
development of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence and its conceptual
implications for applications of the death penalty; and third, the faults
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that render capital juries unable to meet the protective standard that
America’s Death-Is-Different principle requires.

1. Foundational Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Through the examination of two foundational Supreme Court decisions,
Furman v. Georgia and Ring v. Arizona, a paradox within death penalty
jurisprudence becomes apparent: capital juries are a source of arbitrariness in capital sentencing, but they are also considered constitutionally
essential in capital trials.
The Effect of Furman
In 1972, the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia addressed
concerns of arbitrariness inside the structure and application of death
penalty statutes across the country. Citing the random and infrequent
implementation of execution, five of the nine justices held that this
arbitrary imposition of capital punishment violated the cruel and unusual
clause of the Eighth Amendment (Hoeffel). The problem of arbitrariness
stemmed from the uncontrolled discretion of capital sentencers. With no
instructions or guidelines highlighting what to consider when deciding
between life and death, pre-Furman capital jurors “capriciously selected
[a] random handful” of petitioners to be sentenced to death in a manner
that Justice Potter Stewart famously likened to being cruel and unusual in
the way that being struck by lightning was cruel and unusual (Furman).
This type of discretionary sentencing resulted in cases that were “predictably random at best, downright discriminatory at worst” (Abramson).
So, the Court’s decision in Furman resulted in a type of de facto moratorium on death penalty imposition. Until states were able to modify their
death penalty statutes to reduce the freakish and arbitrary nature of
uncontrolled jury discretion, sentencing defendants to death violated the
United States Constitution.
Four years after Furman, through five concurrent Supreme Court
decisions known as the July 2 Cases (Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida,
Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana), death
penalty statutes began to be reinstated state by state. By exhibiting that
they were able to attend to the issues in Furman and minimize the risk of
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arbitrary sentences, three of the five states involved in the July 2 Cases
received approval for their new state death penalty schemes. The sentencing schemes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek each “provided objective
criteria to direct and limit the sentencing discretion” and “allowed the
sentencer…to take into account the character and record of an individual defendant” (Gregg). These results reflect the influence of Furman on
death penalty law. While sentencers still yielded discretionary power,
rational standards were now necessary to determine when executions
were permissible to impose. Additionally, attempts to more severely limit
sentencer discretion (like in the mandatory death sentence schemes of
Woodson and Roberts) were deemed too restrictive. Juries needed to retain
the “constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating
factors” relating to the crime or the individual’s character (Roberts). In
this counterintuitive way, Furman made strides to reduce arbitrary sentencing while preserving the arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer’s
right to use discretion to evaluate mitigating evidence.
The Effect of Ring
As important as it was to regulate how capital sentences were imposed,
it was equally as important to determine by whom they were imposed. Of
the five July 2 Cases that arose in response to the Furman ruling, only one
proposed an option favoring a trial judge over a jury for capital sentencing (Proffitt). After Furman demonstrated the need for more consistent
results, there was a legitimate question of which deciding authority
would be most effective in constitutionally achieving them. In 2002,
thirty years after Furman, the question was decided. In Ring v. Arizona, the
Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant cannot
be “exposed…to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone” (Ring).
This meant that Ring reserved to the jury the task of “fact-finding about
the presence of aggravating circumstances” in a capital case (Abramson).
However, Ring failed to specify which authority must do the actual sentencing under the Eighth Amendment, a topic Justice Stephen Breyer
touched on. Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth Amendment “requires
States to apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death
penalty,” which includes the requirement that a jury be the agent in
charge of imposing any death sentence (Ring). Justice Breyer’s justifi44

SPICE | Philosophy, Politics and Economics Undergraduate Journal

Death is Different. Death Sentencing is Not.

cation for this claim was that jurors possess “an important comparative
advantage over judges,” not because of any special fact-finding talent,
but because they are “better suited to get the ethics of retribution right”
in the realm of reliability and accuracy in capital sentences (Abramson).
The “ethics of retribution” that Justice Breyer refers to is a principle
rooted in “moral relativism when it comes to assessing the results of
the sentencing phase” of capital cases (Abramson). Because of this, the
qualities of reliability and accuracy that Justice Breyer emphasizes to
justify the retributive authorization of capital punishment are relational,
not absolute. This means that the scope of both characteristics ends at
the conscience of the jurors’ community, as opposed to extending out
into right and wrong principles of absolute morality. In Justice Breyer’s
view, to be reliable, a capital sentence must reliably represent the moral
sensibilities of this community, and to be accurate, a jury must make up a
representative cross-section of the community to reflect its experiences
as a whole. For these reasons, under Justice Breyer’s interpretation of
Ring, and in order to provide the strongest safeguard in capital procedures, only juries should have the power to sentence prisoners to death.
With the necessity of a jury system from Ring as well as the establishment
of juror discretion from Furman, these two opposing principles come head
to head and fuel various problems in the American death penalty system.

2. The Concept That Death Is Different
The preceding paradox, of jury arbitrariness and jury necessity, becomes
troublesome when faced with the threshold of heightened reliability that our Death-Is-Different principle requires. Developed through
death penalty jurisprudence and grounded in moral theory, the concept
that death is intrinsically distinct from other punishments “has become
an axiom of American law” (Rhetoric of Difference). This different
nature of capital punishment is what proponents of the death penalty
highlight as essential in our criminal justice system, and it is also why
the Supreme Court held that cases involving capital punishment warrant
special protections from error that non-capital cases do not. Ultimately,
the Death-Is-Different principle implies that if our system is unable to
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accommodate the level of protection that is demanded uniquely of death,
execution must be categorized as an impermissible form of punishment.
Legal Development of Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence
The Death-Is-Different idea was first articulated by Justice William
Brennan in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia. Unlike his contemporaries, Justice Brennan did not call for states to restructure their
capital-sentencing statutes. Instead, he held that execution was unconstitutional in all cases due to reasons that extended past its arbitrary
application. Justice Brennan’s argument stemmed from the notion that
because of its uniqueness, “death as punishment differs in kind, and
not merely degree, from all other punishments” (Furman). Because of
its severity and finality, capital punishment stands in a class of its own,
incomparable to any other accepted form of punishment and “condemned
as fatally offensive to human dignity” (Furman). Although the other
justices did not agree with Justice Brennan’s call to categorically abolish
the death penalty, the notion of human dignity that he put forth had
lasting effects on death penalty jurisprudence moving forward.
The influence of Justice Brennan’s Death-Is-Different argument in
Furman was apparent in the July 2 Cases four years later. In Gregg, Proffitt,
and Jurek, the Supreme Court’s commitment to individualized sentencing was rooted in protecting this intrinsic right of human dignity.
Similarly, when the mandatory death penalty schemes in Woodson and
Roberts were held as unconstitutional, “a plurality of the Court echoed
Brennan’s Furman concurrence,” arguing that the qualitative difference
of death called for a corresponding difference in procedural reliability.
This meant that to protect human dignity, it was necessary to take special
care to prevent erroneous convictions and ensure reliable and appropriate sentences. In the Court’s 1978 decision in Lockett v. Ohio, the reach of
the Death-Is-Different doctrine expanded even further as it broadened
the scope of mitigating factors in capital cases. The Lockett decision held
that capital jurors may not be precluded from considering any range of
mitigating factors before imposing the penalty of death (Lockett). Even
though this powerful expansion of sentencing discretion went against
the Court’s objective of minimizing arbitrariness in capital sentencing, the uniqueness of execution made it necessary. This foundation of
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Death-Is-Different jurisprudence demonstrated that the distinctness
of execution was universally understood. Moreover, it exemplified the
Court’s commitment to the heightened reliability that the doctrine
demands.
Evolving Objectives of Death-Is-Difference Jurisprudence
This development in Death-Is-Different jurisprudence reflected an
evolved conception of both the objective of capital sentencing and the
underlying principles needed to make its practice just. Unlike non-capital cases where sentencers can rely on the word of the law to guide
their judgments, “capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical
judgment—an assessment of the “moral guilt” of the defendant”
(Abramson). Because retribution, the primary justification for capital
punishment, relies on a moral judgment, only an ethical determination
can be the deciding factor of a defendant’s moral guilt in a capital case. So,
when attempting to structure a systematic way to ensure capital juries are
able to make these correct ethical judgments, the principles ingrained in
the decision-making process can be extremely influential.
At the start of Death-Is-Different legal theory, the core principle that
guided the Court’s action was the goal of achieving moral consistency.
After Furman, the freakish and arbitrary nature of the American capital-sentencing system drove the majority opinion to demand revised
state statutes that could provide more consistent results. Of the nine
different Supreme Court opinions in the case, each citing their own
interpretation of Furman, the most agreed-upon point was that capital
sentencing desperately needed to be more morally consistent. This
principle of moral consistency is present in Immanuel Kant’s influential
“Right of Punishing” from The Metaphysics of Morals. In Kantian ethics,
the objective is to consistently stay true to the act that was committed and
respond only to that act and the intrinsic guilt within it. With the purpose
of punishment deriving solely from retribution, this is “the only principle
which in regulating a public court, as distinguished from mere private
judgment, can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just
penalty” (Kant). By holding to this standard, punishments were ensured
to be morally consistent. Extending this theory to the realm of capital
punishment, Kantian ethics holds that capital punishment for murder
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is morally obligated, not just permissible. Any lower sentence would be
morally inconsistent with the crime and the guilt of the offender.
In the case of Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court responded to an
attempt and a failure to apply this Kantian version of moral consistency
to American capital sentencing. Following Furman’s call for discretionary
consistency, North Carolina put forth a mandatory-sentencing scheme
that would ensure consistent sentencing results by defining a narrow
list of crimes that would categorically warrant execution. In deciding
Woodson, a conflict between principles arose. By denying capital juries the
right to exercise their decision-making power, “rigid consistency [was]
in tension with fairness to a particular defendant,” and North Carolina
seemed to place “the search for consistency above the merits of discretion” and opt for securing aggregate consistency over individual fairness
(Abramson). By striking down Woodson’s proposal, the Court decidedly
departed from its goal of achieving moral consistency and took a visible
step in the direction away from Kantian ethics. Woodson and the other
1976 post-Furman decisions demonstrated, instead, a developing prioritization of protecting moral mercy over maintaining moral consistency.
The July 2 Cases whose statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court collectively demonstrated the developing value of moral mercy within
Death-Is-Different jurisprudence. While the discretionary power of
capital juries was limited by the requirement of identifying aggravating factors in order to impose the death penalty, the Court left absolute
autonomy to the jurors to decide not to impose it. By reserving the right
for capital juries to withhold imposing a capital sentence, even after identifying aggregating factors, the act of relying on leniency and mercy in
order to justify not sentencing an individual to death became both permissible and fundamentally protected. Unlike Kant’s rigid interpretation
of retributive justice, Gregg and its contemporaries “offered an elective
notion of retribution,” where execution is only turned to as a last resort
and after mitigation attempts fall short (Abramson). Lockett, perhaps,
demonstrates an even greater expansion of this principle and a direct
turnaround from the Court’s initial stance in Furman. The Court held under
Lockett that states must leave the category of mitigating factors “infinite
and undefined” (Abramson). This meant that any interference by the law
to limit the discretion of sentencers not to impose the death penalty was
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unconstitutional. In essence, only the uncontrolled discretion of jurors
could accurately and reliably determine what information is relevant to
the principle of mercy. It left the power completely up to the independent
discretion of jurors to choose when to impose executions, and in effect,
the Lockett decision made a one-hundred-and-eighty-degree turn away
from the Court’s previous effort to constrain discretion and deliberation
in capital sentencing.
The principle underlying Death-Is-Different jurisprudence that remains
now is one that rests on a philosophy of moral contouring. Reminiscent
of “what Aristotle called the difference between equity and justice,” the
law (or legal justice) is presented in universal terms meant to apply to all
cases of one particular issue (Abramson). However, Aristotle noted that
“there are some things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in
universal terms,” and the law’s attempt to make correct determinations
about those non-universal things can fall short (Abramson). In these
cases, fairness (or equity) is necessary to fix legal mistakes, a process that
is only possible if we resist the urge to blindly adhere to the law. Due to
these nuances, our evolved death penalty legal theory rests on the method
of looking to the discretion of jurors to investigate the moral contours of
particular situations. To amend the erring nature of rigid laws, we rely
on sentencers and their sense of fairness to deliver reasonable decisions,
even if that means acting out of pure mercy and nothing else.

3. The Failure of Capital Sentencing Juries
Throughout Part 1, it was established that juries cause arbitrariness
but are nonetheless essential in capital cases. Throughout Part 2, the
evolution of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence and its guiding principles
were traced with a result that leaves us in a legal system that relies heavily
on individual jurors to instill fairness into capital sentencing. From Part
3, it will become evident that structural problems in our criminal justice
system inhibit capital jurors from accurately and reliably doing the job
they are tasked with. Below, I will evidence some of these problems by
specifically highlighting: the process of death-qualifying jurors, the
faulty nature of jury instructions, and the systematic factors that remove
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the sense of “ultimate responsibility” from capital jurors and insulate
them from the gravity of their decision.
Death-Qualifying Jurors
The process of death-qualifying jurors in capital cases is perhaps the
most blatant structural roadblock that inhibits our death penalty system
from working the way it should. The jury is a crucial democratic institution that “represents the coalescence of a great diversity of community
attitudes,” which are fundamental to the success of the criminal justice
system (Mandery 392-398). Without a proper jury make-up, the full
range of community opinions cannot be represented, and a fair tribunal
is impossible to be achieved. The Supreme Court has held again and
again that the exclusion of specific groups from jury make-up degrades
the “meaningful community participation” that juries are supposed
to provide. Yet, despite the Court’s deep commitment to this principle
of diversity, the death-qualifying process in capital jury selection cuts
directly against it. Especially in capital sentencing, where the stakes of
the jury’s decision are the highest of all criminal proceedings, it is imperative that the jury system functions properly. As Justice Breyer argued in
Ring v. Arizona, juries hold a “constitutionally significant advantage” over
other sentencers due to “the very composition or makeup of the jury as a
‘representative cross-section’ of the community” (Abramson). However,
the death-qualification process that capital juries go through changes
this composition and, thus, removes the constitutionally significant
advantage that juries supposedly hold.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court constrained the extent to
which the make-up of capital juries could be modified to consist of jurors
who looked favorably upon the death penalty, but it did not constrain
pro-death-penalty selective jury modification to the fullest possible
extent. The decision barred prosecutors from striking, with cause, jurors
who “indicated they had conscientious scruples” against inflicting the
death penalty but agreed they could put their oppositions aside if the case
demanded it (Death Qualification). While this holding made strides to
dilute the pro-death-penalty bias that death qualification creates, it still
protects the categorical exclusion of another group of potential jurors:
those who are not able to put their moral objections to the death penalty
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aside if the case demands it. As identified and criticized in Justice William
Douglas’s concurring opinion in Witherspoon, by permitting the elimination of jurors who are unable to put aside their moral opposition to
execution, the Court allows capital juries to be “drawn with [the] systematic and intentional exclusion of some qualified groups” (Witherspoon).
However, eighteen years after Witherspoon, the Court reaffirmed their
position in Lockhart v. McCree, maintaining that the exclusion of these
jurors does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights (Lockhart).
This action, which solidified the overt exclusion of certain jurors, has
three major disabling effects on capital juries: it makes them less representative; it alters their overall perspective; and it makes them more
prone to convictions.
The reduction in representation is the most obvious effect that the
death-qualification process creates in capital juries. By excluding jurors
who oppose capital punishment, certain groups of the population are
systematically removed from the jury selection process. Within this
excludable class, there is a “disproportionate number of blacks and
women,” which already creates an imbalance where jury make-up is less
of a fair cross-section of the community that it is supposed to be representing (Mandery 388-392). Because of this biased selection process,
the individuals who make it onto death-qualified juries hold collectively
different perspectives than the jurors who make up regular mixed juries
(who do not have to go through the death-qualifying process).
Studies have shown that, on average, death-qualified jurors are “more
likely to believe that a defendant’s failure to testify is indicative of his
guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous convictions”
(Mandery 388-392). In an aggregate sense, the narrow, less-representative selection of people that makes up death-qualified juries has a strong
pro-prosecution bias that can influence its interpretation of the evidence
and deliberation process. Finally, death-qualified juries tend to be more
prone to conviction. The Capital Jury Project conducted studies that found
that juries selected for capital trials “tend to place more emphasis on
aggravating factors and overlook or minimize mitigating factors…concluding that jury selection itself yields a jury that is more likely to convict
a defendant and to impose a death sentence than a jury that was not death
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qualified” (Death Qualification). Just the process of death qualification
has been shown to “predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that
the defendant is guilty,” by simply focusing their attention on the death
penalty before the guilt phase has begun (Mandery 388-392). Death-qualified juries slant capital sentencing in favor of convictions and sentences
of death, an effect that utterly undermines the fair nature of jury-based
sentencing.
Ultimately, the process of death qualification persists because individuals
argue that it is necessary to question potential jurors “in order to discover
whether they will be able to follow the law in deciding what sentence to
impose” (Death Qualification). However, demonstrated in the complexity
of capital sentencing and the Death-Is-Different principle, the responsibility of a capital juror is to make an ethical judgment, not a legal one.
As our evolved Death-Is-Different jurisprudence has demonstrated, the
rigidity of law can miss the mark, and we have no choice but to rely on
the fairness and morality of jurors to “rectify the inevitable shortcomings
of general legal rules” when it comes to deciding between something as
monumental as life or death (Abramson).
Jury Instructions
Consistently unclear and misleading jury instructions also prevent capital
juries from fulfilling the duty that our Death-Is-Different jurisprudence
demands of them. Exercising moral discretion and determining when
mercy is deserved are powers intentionally left to capital jurors through
decades of Supreme Court decisions. However, interviews conducted
across multiple states revealed that the wording of judicial instructions
have misled “a substantial number of capital jurors” into misinterpreting
the capital sentencing structure and the leniency that they are constitutionally allowed to grant (Abramson). In 1998, the question of misleading
jury instructions was brought to the Court in Buchanan v. Angelone. When
striking down Buchanan’s case, Justice William Rehnquist argued that
“there [was] not a reasonable likelihood” that the jurors interpreted the
Virginia instruction to preclude the consideration of mitigating evidence,
and the Court had no distinct obligation to instruct on mitigation
(Buchanan).
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However, two years later another case was brought to the Court, in
which a capital jury explicitly expressed confusion over the same piece of
instruction. Unsure if it was permissible for them to withhold imposing
the death penalty despite the presence of an aggravating factor, the jury
sent a note to the presiding judge plainly asking for a clarification on this
foundational rule. The judge “simply redirected their attention to the
wording,” as “the Constitution requires nothing more” of a judge than
a repetition of the instruction in question (Abramson). Misleading jury
instructions, the inaction of judges to provide clarification, and the resistance of the Supreme Court to enforce clearer instructions all undermine
the balance of the capital jury system. By allowing jury instructions to
continually mislead jurors about their abilities, “the Court becomes
unwilling to enforce any longer the core component of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence,” which requires jurors to “exercise moral discretion
and particularized justice” in capital sentencing (Abramson).
Removed Sense of Responsibility
Finally, there are systematic factors, existing as a result of flaws embedded
in the American death penalty system, which degrade the critical sense of
ultimate responsibility that capital jurors hold. Deciding between life and
death is a tremendous burden, and, as such, it is a burden that is necessary
to translate the gravity of the decision to the sentencer in any capital case.
As demonstrated in Ring, the jury is the only agent truly able to combine
the law with its own sense of fairness to determine which outcome is truly
just in an individual case. Because it requires an ethical determination,
and not a legal one, the decision of capital sentencers holds a weight that
is in a class of its own in the criminal justice system. Clearly, the responsibility given to capital jurors is significant, and it is imperative that they
accept this responsibility and treat it as so.
In 1985, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court demonstrated the
importance and fragility of the responsibility of capital jurors. During the
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the jurors not to view themselves as the final decider of the defendant’s fate and to instead place that
burden on the Mississippi Supreme Court who would review the trial after
a decision was made. The Supreme Court held this action by the prosecution as constitutionally impermissible, exhibiting a need to protect
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the sense of responsibility instilled in capital jurors. Justice Thurgood
Marshall demonstrated his “belief in the truth of the assumption that
sentencers treat their power to determine the appropriateness of death
as an awesome responsibility,” and he identified this truth as the reason
sentencer discretion is indispensable to Death-Is-Different jurisprudence
(Caldwell). By diluting the responsibility of the capital jury, “substantial
unreliability as well as bias in the favor of death sentences” become very
real threats within capital cases (FindLaw). The respect of juror responsibility truly is the foundation that our death penalty institution has
evolved to rely upon. Despite this, certain aspects of our implementation
of capital punishment actively degrade the juror responsibility that the
Court so fervently protected in Caldwell. Both the artificial perception
of rationality instilled in the capital sentencing system and the distance
between capital sentencers and the actual act of execution contribute to
the dilution of this “awesome responsibility,” and ultimately hinder the
reliability of the jury system.
American death penalty legal history is uniquely complex and shockingly
ineffective. This inconsistency creates an outside perception of the system
that differs drastically from the actual mechanics of it. From Furman and
Gregg, and even until today, our jurisprudence has been complicated
and contradictory, leaving us in an ambiguous moment regarding the
realities of our death penalty system. Our strong legal emphasis on the
Death-Is-Different principle of heightened reliability creates a “strong
but false sense that levels of safeguards” work accurately to protect
against “unjust and arbitrary executions” (Mandery 171-180). However,
in practice, the requirement of heightened reliability “surfaces unpredictably at the margins of state capital schemes” and seems to carry the
arbitrary characteristics of pre-Furman executions (Mandery 171-180).
Despite this inconsistency, the Court’s Death-Is-Different doctrine has
been effective in instilling a sense of rationality in our seemingly irrational system. The piles of ad hoc limitations that have been added onto
death penalty legislation appear to legitimatize our system and exaggerate the general belief that it is justifiable regardless of whether or not it
is in reality. Even for actors inside the system, this perception can guide
their behavior. Due to the jurisprudence that claims to limit and control
the discretion of sentencers, an artificial aura of regulation circles above
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the innately unregulated nature of making a moral judgment to take an
individual’s life. This can result in an “empirical sense of belief in the
normative justifiability of” the capital punishment system, making jurors
more comfortable in their role as sentencer (Mandery 171-180). With
greater comfort in their role, the anxiety related to imposing execution
that jurors feel is lowered. Similar to how the prosecutor in Caldwell
shirked some of the jury’s responsibility off onto the Appellate Courts,
this perception of rationality takes some of the weight off of the decision
of capital juries. In this way, the façade of regulation that our jurisprudence creates lessens the responsibility that jurors have to bear—and,
consequently, their reliability as sentencer).
Last, and most striking, the distance between jurors and the actual
execution of defendants numbs capital jurors from the reality of their
actions and inherently diminishes the responsibility they feel when
imposing execution. Since the last public execution of Rainey Bethea
in 1909, private execution laws have strictly limited our perception,
knowledge of, and attitudes toward the execution of criminals. From
1909 until now, executions have moved from public spectacles to acts
that are intentionally hidden from public view. The number of witnesses
allowed at executions have been severely restricted, detailed newspaper
reporting on executions has been criminalized, and many state laws have
even restricted executions to certain hours at night that will minimize
possible news reports on them. The justification for most of these regulations initially derived from the desire to rid society of the savageness
that tended to accompany public executions. In order to “protect society’s
sensibilities,” executions were made private and have become increasingly distant from public view ever since (Bessler). However, the laws
intended to insulate us from becoming morally corrupt have instead
“removed the issue of capital punishment from public consciousness and
made Americans apathetic toward executions” (Bessler).
This apathy has grown larger with time and, perhaps, is the reason that
the death penalty persists in America despite being abolished in most
other Western democracies. Moreover, this distant view of execution as
something foreign and removed from reality undeniably affects the individuals sitting on capital juries. Even though we task capital jurors with
making the ultimate decision of whether or not to end a person’s life,
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after they deliver their verdict, they leave the courthouse without directly
facing the consequence of their actions. For this reason, in John Bessler’s
Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions in America, he calls for “jurors who
sentence criminal defendants to death” to “pull the triggering switch at
their executions” (Bessler). Bessler’s proposition is certainly radical, but
if the distance between sentencing and actual execution had no effect on
jurors, then his proposal should be much easier to agree to than it seems
to be.
The detachment of jurors from the enormity of their decisions and, thus,
the gravity of their decisions is perhaps best highlighted by the Trolley
Problem in ethical theory. The Trolley Problem presents a series of
scenarios in which actors make choices that result in the saving or killing
of bystanders due to a runaway trolley. The most famous version of the
moral dilemma hinges on whether the actor should do nothing and allow
the trolley to kill five bystanders on the main track or whether they should
pull a lever to divert the trolley onto a side track that will kill only one
bystander. However, a variation of the thought experiment substitutes
pulling the lever with physically pushing one bystander onto the track
to save the other five. Consequentially, there should not be a difference
between pulling a lever or pushing someone, but there is. Likewise, in
capital sentencing, there should not be a difference between the gravity of
sentencing someone to death and the gravity of executing them yourself,
but like the Trolley Problem, there is. This analogy demonstrates that
somewhere within our capital-sentencing system, jurors have lost a
part of the true responsibility that should accompany such an important
decision. Requiring juries to have direct confrontation with executions
(be that “pulling the trigger” or simply observing the act) would “inject
some much needed accountability and personal responsibility” into
capital sentencing (Bessler). Requiring jurors to watch the result of their
sentencing does not make the act of execution worse; it just makes the
“reality inescapable” (Bessler). If this confrontation is too demoralizing
for jurors, then it only reasons that the monumental decision of taking
that defendant’s life should not be reached. Because this is not the case
in our capital-punishing system, the moral responsibility felt by jurors is
obviously not symmetric to the moral gravity of their decisions.
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The process of death-qualifying jurors, the persistence of misleading
jury instructions, and the removed sense of responsibility held by capital
sentencers are all mechanisms that undermine the heightened protections within capital punishment sentencing that the Death-Is-Different
doctrine demands. In three distinct ways, these mechanisms demonstrate how capital juries are intrinsically flawed from their formation to
the ultimate purpose. Importantly, these are not just one-off problems.
Rather, they are systematic issues built into the structure of our death
penalty sentencing and our criminal justice system.

Conclusion
It is evident that our death penalty system as it functions today is flawed.
Foundational capital sentencing jurisprudence directly conflicts. Moral
principles that should act as the grounding for our legal decisions have
morphed over time. And, the democratic institution of capital juries has
inherent flaws that prevent jurors from fulfilling their purpose. The contradictions between Court decisions, legal principles, moral theories, and
practical applications result in complicated problems with no apparent
fix. Ultimately, it follows that using capital juries to impose the death
penalty, even under heightened protections, does not result in a truly fair
and just tribunal. Looking past all the noise and competing opinions surrounding capital punishment, every side can agree that, as a punishment,
death is different. This uniqueness requires special care that our criminal
justice institution, as it functions today, is not providing. Rather than
continuing to pile on ad hoc regulations and distance sentencers (and the
public) from the reality of capital sentencing, the permissibility of the
institution should be reconsidered. Execution is an incredibly powerful
act and, under the right application, can feasibly have a place in criminal
punishment. Nonetheless, applied in an unjust way, capital punishment
provides no service to our nation and leaves us with a lack of legitimate
retributive justice. For these reasons, it can no longer be used.
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